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Abstract
This paper gives an explicit presentation of Newtonian gravitation on the
backdrop of Maxwell spacetime, giving a sense in which acceleration is rela-
tive in gravitational theory. However, caution is needed: assessing whether
this is a robust or interesting sense of the relativity of acceleration depends
upon some subtle technical issues, and upon substantive philosophical ques-
tions over how to identify the spacetime structure of a theory.
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1 Introduction
The following two observations are well-known to philosophers of physics:
1. Newtonian gravitation admits, in addition to the well-known velocity-
boost and potential-shift symmetries, a “gravitational gauge symme-
try” in which the gravitational field is altered.
2. Newtonian gravitation may be presented in a “geometrised” form known
as Newton-Cartan theory,1 in which the dynamically allowed trajecto-
ries are the geodesics of a non-flat connection.
Moreover, it is widely held that these two observations are intimately related.
However, aspects of this relationship remain somewhat obscure. In particu-
lar, there is widespread disagreement over the sense in which the symmetry of
observation 1 motivates the move from a non-geometrised formulation to the
geometrised formulation of observation 2; and over the extent to which such
motivation ought to be regarded as analogous to the use of the velocity-boost
symmetry to motivate the move from Newtonian to Galilean spacetime, or
to the use of the potential-shift symmetry to motivate the move from a for-
mulation in terms of gravitational potentials to a formulation in terms of
gravitational fields.
In this paper, I seek to clarify this relationship. First, I consider the
symmetry from point 1 above, in the context of Newtonian gravitation set
on Galilean spacetime. I then briefly review the geometrised formulation of
the theory, and discuss some puzzling aspects concerning the relativity of
acceleration. This motivates an exploration of Maxwell spacetime, and the
presentation of a Newtonian theory of gravitation set on Maxwell spacetime.
I then look at how this theory relates to Newton-Cartan theory, and explore
how this illuminates the conceptual issues with which we began.
1Due originally to Trautman (1965).
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2 Galilean gravitation
I will assume familiarity with the differential-geometric architecture stan-
dardly used to present classical gravitational theories.2 All the theories we
will consider postulate at least as much structure as that of Leibnizian space-
time, which comprises data 〈M, ta, hab〉: here, M is a differential manifold
which is diffeomorphic to R4; ta is a smooth, curl-free 1-form; and hab is a
smooth, symmetric rank-(0, 2) tensor, of signature (0,+,+,+). ta and h
ab
are orthogonal, i.e., they satisfy
tah
ab = 0 (1)
Given our topological assumptions, ta induces a foliation of M into three-
dimensional hypersurfaces; we require that each such hypersurface is diffeo-
morphic to R3. hab induces a three-dimensional metric on each hypersurface.
We require that each hypersurface is complete relative to this induced metric,
and that the induced metric is flat.3 We will use L to denote a Leibnizian
spacetime. If L = 〈M, ta, hab〉 is a Leibnizian spacetime, then a connection
∇ on M is said to be compatible with L just in case it satisfies
∇atb = 0 (2a)
∇ahbc = 0 (2b)
We will only consider compatible connections in this paper.
A Galilean spacetime is a Leibnizian spacetime equipped with a flat (com-
patible) connection. The first theory we will consider is that of Newtonian
gravitation on Galilean spacetime—for short, “Galilean gravitation”. Each
model of such a theory comprises the following data:
• A Galilean spacetime 〈L,∇〉
2See Friedman (1983), Earman (1989), and—especially—Malament (2012).
3For more detail on the above, see (Malament, 2012, §4.1).
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• A spacelike vector field Ga
• A rank-(2, 0) tensor field T ab
satisfying the following equations:
∇aGa = −4piρ (3a)
∇[cGa] = 0 (3b)
∇nT na = ρGa (3c)
where ρ = T abtatb.
The vector field Ga represents the gravitational field, and the tensor field
T ab represents the mass-momentum of whatever matter or fields are present
(with the scalar field ρ representing the mass density). I have chosen to
work with a gravitational field, related to the mass density by the source
equation (3a), rather than with a gravitational potential. This is simply in
order to remove the gauge symmetries of the potential, so that we can focus
on those symmetries that alter the field itself. Equation (3b), the condition
that the gravitational field is twist-free, ensures that this decision is harmless:
given our assumptions about the topology of L, it holds of Ga if and only if
there is a scalar field ϕ such thatGa = −∇aϕ.4 Finally, equation (3c) encodes
the dynamics of the matter (both gravitational and non-gravitaitonal).
To illuminate this last remark, note that wherever ρ 6= 0, we can decom-
pose T ab by defining5
ξa = ρ−1T abtb (4a)
σab = T ab − ρξaξb (4b)
4See (Malament, 2012, Proposition 4.1.6). Note that this is analogous to the role played
by the equation ∇×E = 0 in electrostatics.
5The below follows (Malament, 2012, pp. 265–266).
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so that
T ab = ρξaξb + σab (5)
ξa is a unit, future-directed timelike field (interpretable as the net motion
of the matter) and σab is a symmetric field spacelike in both indices (inter-
pretable as the stress tensor for the matter). Equation (3c) then holds if and
only if the equations
ρ∇aξa + ξa∇aρ = 0 (6a)
ρξa∇aξb = ρGb −∇aσab (6b)
hold. Thus, in the presence of mass, equation (3c) encodes both a continuity
equation (6a) and an equation of motion (6b). Given a model of Galilean
gravitation, we will refer to the integral curves of ξa as the dynamical tra-
jectories : so the dynamical trajectories undergo an acceleration due to the
gravitational field, and due to the non-gravitational forces encoded by the
stress tensor. Obviously, in a realistic application one would impose further
equations on T ab, capturing the details of the non-gravitational dynamics.
The theory (3) is only intended to provide a framework for analysing the-
ories involving gravitation, at a reasonably high level of generality (whilst
nevertheless including an explicit representation of the mass-momentum).
It will be helpful to have a term for a structure 〈L,∇, Ga, T ab〉 which does
not necessarily satisfy equations (3).6 We will refer to such a structure as
a model-candidate for Galilean gravitation. The metaphysically inlined may
think of model-candidates as representing worlds which are metaphysically
possible according to Galilean gravitation (they contain the right ontologi-
cal ingredients), and of models as representing worlds which are physically
possible according to Galilean gravitation (they contain the right ontological
ingredients, arranged in the right way).
Our concern in this paper is with a certain transformation one can make
6That is, what in e.g. Belot (2007) is referred to as a “kinematical possibility”.
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of the models of this theory—specifically, one obtained by altering the con-
nection and gravitational field as follows:
∇ 7→ ∇′ = (∇, ηatbtc) (7a)
Ga 7→ G′a = Ga − ηa (7b)
where ηa is any spacelike vector field such that ∇aηb = 0. The notation
(∇, ηatbtc) follows Malament: (Malament, 2012, Proposition 1.7.3) shows
that given any connection ∇ on a manifold M , any other connection ∇′
may be expressed in the form (∇, Cabc) (for some symmetric tensor field Cabc),
meaning that for any tensor field T a1...arb1...bs on M :
∇′cT a1...arb1...bs =∇cT a1...arb1...bs
− Ca1cnT na2...arb1...bs − · · · − CarcnT
a1...ar−1n
b1...bs
+ Cncb1T
a1...ar
nb2...bs
+ · · ·+ CncbsT a1...arb1...bs−1n
(8)
It is straightforward to show that the transformation (7) is a symmetry of
Galilean gravitation, in the following sense: if ∇′ = (∇, ηatbtc) and G′a =
Ga − ηa are substituted into the equations (3), we get the same equations
out again (and if∇ is flat, then so is∇′). Consequently, any model-candidate
〈L,∇, Ga, T ab〉 is a model of Galilean gravitation if and only if 〈L,∇′, G′a, T ab〉
is also a model of Galilean gravitation.
Now, if we read the theory literally, then these two models would appear
to represent distinct possibilities (since the two models are not isomorphic
to one another). That is, if all the mathematical structures present in the
models are taken to represent physical structure, then the two models dis-
agree over what the world is like: they disagree over the magnitude of the
gravitational field, for instance, and over the acceleration of matter. Yet this
is a problematic judgment, since it seems that two such possibilities would
be epistemically indistinguishable from one another: all seemingly observa-
tionally accessible quantities, such as relative distances, are the same in the
6
two models. Such epistemic underdetermination gives us some reason to
think that we should seek another theory which, read literally, does not give
rise to such a problem (whilst still capturing the “good” content of Galilean
gravitation, i.e., the content that is invariant under (7)).7
3 Newton-Cartan gravitation
The standard view is that such a theory is provided by Newton-Cartan grav-
itation. Let us say that a Newton-Cartan connection, for a given Leibnizian
spacetime, is a (compatible) connection ∇˜ whose curvature tensor R˜abcd obeys
the homogeneous Trautman conditions :
R˜abcd = 0 (9a)
R˜a cb d = R˜
c a
d b (9b)
and that a Newton-Cartan spacetime consists of a Leibnizian spacetime L
together with a Newton-Cartan connection for L. Note that all flat con-
nections obey the conditions (9), and so are Newton-Cartan connections; as
such, Galilean spacetime is a Newton-Cartan spacetime. A model of Newton-
Cartan gravitation then comprises
• A Newton-Cartan spacetime 〈L, ∇˜〉
• A tensor field T ab
7The above kind of argument is an instance of a more general one: the claim that
that the differences between symmetry-related models of a theory are (in some sense) not
differences that should be taken seriously, and which should motivate us either to interpret
the theory in such a way that it is not committed to that structure, or to replace the theory
by a more parsimonious one (for discussion, see Møller-Nielsen (2016)). However, it is
controversial both how exactly the notion of “symmetry” should be defined, and how (or
whether) this general interpretational maxim should apply (see Saunders (2003), Brading
and Castellani (2003), Baker (2010), Dewar (2015), Caulton (2015), Dasgupta (2016), and
references therein). Since the general debate is tangential to our purposes, I pass over it
here.
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such that the following equations hold:
R˜bc = 4piρtbtc (10a)
∇˜nT na = 0 (10b)
where the Ricci tensor R˜bc = R˜
a
bca and (as before) ρ = T
abtatb.
Thus, the source equation (10a) relates the mass density to the curvature
of spacetime, rather than to the gravitational field. If we have ρ 6= 0, then
we can decompose T ab as in equation (5) to obtain
ρ∇˜aξa + ξa∇˜aρ = 0 (11a)
ρξa∇˜aξb = −∇˜aσab (11b)
So the continuity equation (11a) is unchanged, but the equation of motion
(11b) only features acceleration due to non-gravitational forces: the grav-
itational acceleration has been “absorbed” into the curved Newton-Cartan
connection.
The relationship between Galilean gravitation and Newton-Cartan grav-
itation is captured in what are known as the geometrisation and recovery
theorems.8 The former states that from any model of Galilean gravitation,
one can obtain a unique model of Newton-Cartan gravitation: namely, that
given by taking ∇˜ = (∇, Gatbtc). Note that two models of Galilean grav-
itation which are related by the transformation (7) will generate the same
model of Newton-Cartan gravitation. The latter asserts that given a model
of Newton-Cartan gravitation, there is a model of Galilean gravitation re-
lated to it by ∇˜ = (∇, Gatbtc) for some twist-free spacelike field Ga; several
models, in fact, corresponding to different choices of Ga (and all related to
one another by transformations of the form (7)). It is in this sense that
Newton-Cartan gravitation captures the invariant content of Galilean grav-
itation: there is a systematic one-to-one correspondence between models of
8See (Malament, 2012, Propositions 4.2.1, 4.2.5), Trautman (1965).
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Newton-Cartan gravitation and equivalence classes of (7)-related models of
Galilean gravitation.
At the same time, however, there is something potentially puzzling about
this case. As mentioned above, the acceleration of the matter represented
by ξa is not invariant under the transformations (7). If models related by
such a transformation correspond to the same physical situation, then the
natural reading would seem to be that accelerations are not a real, or objec-
tive, or absolute feature of the world (according to Newtonian gravitational
theory). This notion is supported by reflection on the transition from setting
Newtonian gravitation on Newtonian spacetime (wherein there is a standard
of absolute rest) to setting it on Galilean spacetime. Here, we observe that
applying a “boost” transformation is a symmetry of the dynamics. In New-
tonian spacetime, trajectories have (absolute) velocities, relative to absolute
space; but those velocities are not invariant under boosts. This is generally
taken to licence the claim that such velocities are not real, or objective, or
absolute features of the world (according to the best interpretation of the
theory). This claim is supported by the fact that we can set the theory in-
stead on Galilean spacetime, in which there is not the structure required to
impute absolute velocities to trajectories. So if this transition involves the
repudiation of absolute velocities (since they are not invariant under boosts),
analogous reasoning would suggest that the move from Galilean gravitation
to Newton-Cartan gravitation should involve the repudation of absolute ac-
celerations (since they are not invariant under (7)).
However, the orthodox view is that this is decisively not the case. The
reason for this is straightforward: any model of Newton-Cartan gravitation
does have enough structure to make pronouncements on the accelerations of
trajectories, since it contains a privileged connection ∇˜. As such, in transi-
tioning from Galilean to Newton-Cartan gravitation,
We eliminate the notions of absolute acceleration and rotation
relative to ∇, but we replace them with new notions of absolute
9
acceleration and rotation relative to ∇˜. Hence, the move from
[Galilean gravitation] to [Newton-Cartan gravitation] does not
involve a relativization of acceleration parallel to the relativiza-
tion of velocity [. . . ]9
Here is another way of expressing the idea that Newton-Cartan spacetime is
just as committed to absolute acceleration as Galilean spacetime was: the
Newton-Cartan connection is not invariant under a transformation of the
form (7a).10 So let us consider what kind of structure is so invariant.
4 Maxwell gravitation
Given a Galilean spacetime 〈L,∇〉, the structure that is invariant under a
transformation of the form (7a) goes by the moniker of Maxwell spacetime.11
Intuitively, the idea is that a Maxwell spacetime contains a “standard of
rotation”, but no “standard of acceleration”. More precisely,12 we say that a
pair of connections ∇ and ∇′ compatible with a given Leibnizian spacetime
L are rotationally equivalent if, for any unit timelike field θa on L, ∇[aθb] = 0
iff ∇′[aθb] = 0. Then, a Maxwell spacetime comprises
• A Leibnizian spacetime L
• A standard of rotation [∇]: an equivalence class of rotationally equiv-
alent flat affine connections (compatible with L)
The following proposition demonstrates the invariance of Maxwell spacetime
under (7a):
9(Friedman, 1983, p. 122); I have modified Friedman’s notation to fit with that used in
this paper.
10The question of whether it is invariant under a transformation of the form (7) is rather
more subtle.
11(Earman, 1989, chap. 2)
12This definition follows Weatherall (2015).
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Proposition 1. Let 〈L, [∇]〉 be a Maxwell spacetime, and consider any ∇ ∈
[∇]. For any other flat connection ∇′, ∇′ ∈ [∇] (i.e. ∇′ is rotationally
equivalent to ∇) iff ∇′ = (∇, ηatbtc), for some spacelike field ηa such that
∇aηb = 0.
Proof. The “if” direction is straightforward: if ∇′ = (∇, ηatbtc), then
∇′[aθb] = ∇[aθb] − tntkθkhn[aηb]
= ∇[aθb]
and so ∇ and ∇′ are rotationally equivalent.
The “only if” direction follows immediately from the proof of Proposition
3 in Weatherall (2015).
So given a pair of models of Galilean gravitation related by (7), the struc-
ture shared by their Galilean spacetimes 〈L,∇〉 and 〈L,∇′〉 is that of their
common Maxwell spacetime 〈L, [∇]〉.
Recently, Saunders (2013) has queried whether we really should regard
Newton-Cartan theory as the spacetime theory that properly encodes the
lessons of the symmetry canvassed above: he argues that we can “interpret
[Newton’s] laws [. . . ] directly as concerning the relative motions of particle
pairs”,13 and hence, as describing a theory set on Maxwell spacetime rather
than Galilean spacetime.14 Saunders’ analysis concerns the point-particle
formulation of Newtonian gravitation, but he continues:
There remain important questions, above all, moving over to a
manifold formulation: What is the relation between a theory of
gravity (and other forces) formulated in Maxwell space-time and
one based on Newton-Cartan space-time?15
13(Saunders, 2013, p. 41)
14Strictly, against the backdrop of a spacetime structure equivalent to it, which Saunders
refers to as “Newton-Huygens spacetime”.
15(Saunders, 2013, p. 46)
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Obviously, assessing that relationship requires us to first present such a the-
ory set on Maxwell spacetime.
Without further ado, then, a model of Maxwell gravitation comprises
• A Maxwell spacetime 〈L, [∇]〉
• A tensor field T ab
such that the following equations hold wherever ρ 6= 0:
ta∇nT na = 0 (12a)
∇a(ρ−1∇nT na) = −4piρ (12b)
∇c(ρ−1∇nT na)−∇a(ρ−1∇nT nc) = 0 (12c)
where ∇ is an arbitrary element of [∇]. Moreover, we also require that if
there are regions of L in which ρ = 0, then the quantity ρ−1∇nT na converges
as such a region is approached.
This is only well-specified if the choice of ∇ is indeed arbitrary. The
following proposition shows that this is, indeed, the case.
Proposition 2. Let 〈L, [∇], T ab〉 be a model-candidate for Maxwell gravi-
tation, and consider any ∇,∇′ ∈ [∇]. Then the equations (12) hold with
respect to ∇ iff they hold with respect to ∇′.
Proof. By Proposition 1, ∇′ = (∇, ηatbtc), for some spacelike field ηa such
that ∇aηb = 0. It follows that
∇′nT na = ∇nT na − ρηa (13)
First, from equation (13)
ta∇′nT na = ta∇nT na (14)
so equation (12a) holds with respect to ∇ iff it holds with respect to ∇′.
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Second, we find that
∇′a(ρ−1∇′nT na) = ∇′a(ρ−1∇nT na − ηa)
= ∇a(ρ−1∇nT na − ηa)− ηatatr(ρ−1∇nT nr − ηr)
= ∇a(ρ−1∇nT na)−∇aηa
Since ∇aηb = 0, ∇aηb = taθn∇nηb, where θn is any future-directed unit
timelike field; it follows that ∇aηa = 0.16 So (12b) holds with respect to ∇
iff it holds with respect to ∇′.
Finally,
∇′c(ρ−1∇′nT na) = ∇′c(ρ−1∇nT na − ηa)
= ∇c(ρ−1∇nT na − ηa)− hdcηatdte(ρ−1∇nT ne − ηe)
= ∇c(ρ−1∇nT na)
And so equation (12c) also holds with respect to ∇ iff it holds with respect
to ∇′.
As with the two previous theories, wherever ρ 6= 0 we can decompose T ab
using (5). It is then straightforward to show that (12a) holds iff
ρ∇aξa + ξa∇aρ = 0 (15)
does—i.e., the continuity equation carries over.
There is not a straightforward analogue of (6b) or (11b) for Maxwell
gravitation (which is to be expected, given that Maxwell spacetime lacks
an absolute standard of acceleration). However, we can show that Maxwell
gravitation determines the relative acceleration of the dynamical trajectories.
That is, given a unit timelike vector field θa on a Maxwell spacetime 〈L, [∇]〉,
let λa be a connecting field for θa: a spacelike vector field such that Lθλa = 0
16This observation is adapted from (Malament, 2012, p. 277).
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(where Lθ denotes the Lie derivative along θa). Intuitively, we think of λa as
joining integral curves of θa to “neighbouring” integral curves. The relative
acceleration of such neighbouring curves is then given by
θn∇n(θm∇mλa) (16)
and has radial component (magnitude in the direction of λa)
λaθ
n∇n(θm∇mλa) (17)
where λa = hˆabλ
b, for hˆab the spatial metric associated to θ
a.17 These expres-
sions are easily shown to be independent of the choice of ∇ ∈ [∇], but they
do depend on λa. If, however, we introduce three connecting fields
1
λa,
2
λa,
3
λa
which are orthonormal to one another, then we can define the average radial
acceleration of θa as the average of the three radial components,
Aθ :=
1
3
3∑
i=1
i
λaθ
n∇n(θm∇m
i
λa) (18)
It can then be shown that the average radial acceleration is independent of
the choice of connecting fields
i
λa; indeed, we have
Proposition 3. Let θa be a unit timelike field on some Maxwell spacetime
〈L, [∇]〉, and suppose that {
i
λa}i are three orthonormal spacelike fields such
that Lθ
i
λa = 0. Then for any ∇ ∈ [∇],
Aθ =
1
3
∇a(θn∇nθa) (19)
Proof. First, some straightforward algebra shows that for any connecting
17In fact, given that λa is spacelike, we could have used the spatial metric associated
to any unit timelike field; but since we have a particular such field knocking around, it is
helpful to fix on it.
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field λa,18
θn∇n(θm∇mλa) = λm∇m(θn∇nθa) (20)
Since the connecting fields are orthonormal,19
∑
i
i
λa
i
λc = δ ca − taθc (21)
Therefore,
Aθ =
1
3
3∑
i=1
i
λaθ
n∇n(θm∇m
i
λa)
=
1
3
∑
i
i
λa
i
λc∇c(θn∇nθa)
=
1
3
(δ ca − taθc)∇c(θn∇nθa)
=
1
3
∇a(θn∇nθa)
Now observe that, given equation (15),
∇n(ρξnξa + σna) = ρξn∇nξa +∇nσna (22)
It follows that if T ab obeys equation (12b), then
Aξ = −4
3
piρ− 1
3
∇a(ρ−1∇nσna) (23)
In other words, Maxwell gravitation specifies the relative acceleration of tra-
jectories (and characterises them as having both a gravitational and non-
gravitational component).
18The calculation is just an adaptation of the proof of (Malament, 2012, Proposi-
tion 1.8.5) to the case where θa is not a geodesic and ∇ is flat.
19(Malament, 2012, Equation 4.1.12)
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5 Comparing Maxwell gravitation and Newton-
Cartan gravitation
We now consider the relationship between Maxwell gravitation and Newton-
Cartan gravitation. First, we say that a connection is compatible with a
given Maxwell spacetime if it is compatible with the Leibnizian substructure
of the Maxwell spacetime, and rotationally equivalent to the members of [∇].
We now prove an intermediate proposition, giving the relationship between
different Newton-Cartan connections compatible with a given standard of
rotation.
Proposition 4. Let 〈L, [∇]〉 be a Maxwell spacetime, and let ∇˜ be any
Newton-Cartan connection compatible with [∇]. Then for any other connec-
tion ∇˜′, ∇˜′ is a Newton-Cartan connection compatible with [∇] if and only
if ∇˜′ = (∇˜, ζatbtc), for some spacelike field ζa such that ∇˜[aζb] = 0.
Proof. First, suppose that ∇˜′ = (∇˜, ζatbtc) for such a field ζa. Then for any
timelike θa,
∇˜′[aθb] = hn[a∇˜′nθb]
= hn[a∇˜nθb] − hn[aζb]θmtmtn
= ∇˜[aθb]
So clearly, ∇˜′[aθb] = 0 iff ∇˜[aθb] = 0, i.e., ∇˜ and ∇˜′ are rotationally equiva-
lent. It remains to show that ∇˜′ satisfies the homogeneous Trautman condi-
tions (9). Applying the standard condition relating two Riemann tensors,20
we obtain
R˜′abcd = R˜
a
bcd + 2tbt[d∇˜c]ζa (24)
20(Malament, 2012, Equation 1.8.2)
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It is then a straightforward computation to show that
R˜′abcd = R˜
ab
cd (25)
So clearly, R˜′abcd = 0 iff R˜
ab
cd = 0.
Next, suppose that R˜a cb d = R˜
c a
d b. Again, a straightforward computation
(together with the twist-freedom of ζa) yields
R˜′a cb d = R˜
′c a
d b (26)
where the third equality uses our supposition, and the twist-freedom of ζa.
Showing that if R˜′a cb d = R˜
′c a
d b then R˜
a c
b d = R˜
c a
d b proceeds similarly.
The converse half of the proof is adapted from Weatherall (2015). Suppose
that ∇˜′ is a Newton-Cartan connection compatible with [∇]. Since ∇˜ and
∇˜′ are both compatible with L, there is some antisymmetric tensor field κab
such that ∇˜′ = (∇˜, 2hant(bκc)n).21 Now let θa be some unit timelike field such
that ∇˜[aθb] = 0 (some such field is guaranteed to exist, since ∇˜ obeys the
homogeneous Trautman conditions).22 Using the fact that ∇˜′[aθb] = 0, we
can show that ∇˜′ = (∇˜, ζatbtc) for some spacelike field ζa (see (Weatherall,
2015, p. 91) for details of the computation).
It remains to show that ζa is twist-free. By using equation (24), we obtain
R˜′a cb d = R˜
a c
b d + 2tbtd∇˜cζa (27)
So by exchange of indices, and applying the second homogeneous Trautman
condition,
tbtd∇˜cζa = tbtd∇˜aζc (28)
Since ta 6= 0, ∇˜[cζa] = 0.
We can now explore the relationship between Maxwell gravitation and
21(Malament, 2012, Proposition 4.1.3)
22See (Malament, 2012, Proposition 4.3.7).
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Newton-Cartan gravitation. The relationship is limited in an important way:
we can establish a correspondence between the models of Maxwell gravitation
and those of Newton-Cartan gravitation only in the case of an everywhere
nonvanishing mass density. However, each such model of Newton-Cartan
gravitation is naturally associated with a unique such model of Maxwell
gravitation, and vice versa. This provides a sense in which the two theories
might be regarded as equivalent over the nonvanishing-mass sector, since
the mutual pair of associations might be regarded as showing how the two
theories are intertranslatable with one another.23
Proposition 5. Let 〈L, ∇˜, T ab〉 be a model of Newton-Cartan gravitation
such that at all points in L, ρ 6= 0. Then there is a unique standard of
rotation [∇] such that ∇˜ is compatible with [∇]; and 〈L, [∇], T ab〉 is a model
of Maxwell gravitation.
Proof. First, define [∇] as consisting of all and only those connections which
are flat, and which are rotationally equivalent to ∇˜. By the Trautman re-
covery theorem, there is at least one such connection, so [∇] is nonempty.
Hence, it is indeed a standard of rotation with which ∇˜ is compatible—and
it is manifestly unique in this regard.
It remains to show that 〈L, [∇], T ab〉 is a model of Maxwell gravitation.
Let ∇ be an arbitrary element of [∇]. ∇ is a Newton-Cartan connection,24
and is evidently compatible with [∇]; so by Proposition 4, ∇˜ = (∇, ζatbtc)
for a spacelike ζa such that ∇˜[aζb] = 0. Since ∇˜ and ∇ are rotationally
equivalent, we also have that ∇[aζb] = 0. By equation (10b),
ρζa = ∇nT na (29)
So first, the fact that ζa is spacelike entails that (12a) is satisfied.
23cf. Glymour (1970), Glymour (1977), Barrett and Halvorson (2015).
24As remarked earlier, any flat connection trivially satisfies the homogeneous Trautman
conditions.
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Second, from (10a) and the standard equation relating curvature tensors
for different connections, we obtain
4piρtbtc = R˜bc
= 2tbt[a∇c]ζa
= −tbtc∇a(ρ−1∇nT na)
Since ta 6= 0, it follows that equation (12b) is satisfied.
Finally,
∇c(ρ−1∇nT na)−∇a(ρ−1∇nT nc) = ∇[cζa]
= 0
So equation (12c) is satisfied.
Proposition 6. Let 〈L, [∇], T ab〉 be a model of Maxwell gravitation such that
at all points in L, ρ 6= 0. Then there is a unique Newton-Cartan connection
∇˜ compatible with [∇] such that 〈L, ∇˜, T ab〉 is a model of Newton-Cartan
gravitation.
Proof. First, we show existence. Let ∇ be an arbitrary element of [∇], and
define
∇˜ = (∇, tbtcρ−1∇nT na) (30)
∇˜ is a Newton-Cartan connection compatible with [∇]. For, given Propo-
sition 4, it suffices to observe that ρ−1∇nT na is a spacelike field which is
twist-free (by equations (12a) and (12c)).
Further, 〈L, ∇˜, T ab〉 is a model of Newton-Cartan gravitation. First, from
equation (12b),
R˜bc = −tbtc∇a(ρ−1∇nT na)
= 4piρtbtd
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So equation (10a) is satisfied. Second,
∇˜nT na = ∇nT na − tntk(ρ−1∇mTmn)− tntk(ρ−1∇mTma)T nk
= ∇nT na −∇mTma
= 0
where we have used equation (12a). So equation (10b) is satisfied.
We now prove uniqueness. Suppose that ∇˜ and ∇˜′ are two Newton-
Cartan connections, compatible with [∇], such that ∇˜nT na = ∇˜′nT na =
0. By Proposition (4), ∇˜′ = (∇˜, ζatbtc), where ∇˜[aζb] = 0. But then by
equation (13), ∇˜′nT na = ∇˜nT na − ζa. So by supposition (and the fact that
ρ 6= 0), ζa = 0, and so ∇˜′ = ∇˜.
6 Constructing spacetime
Let’s take stock. On the face of it, a model of Maxwell gravitation 〈L, [∇], T ab〉
might be imagined to have strictly less structure than a model of Newton-
Cartan gravitation 〈L, ∇˜, T ab〉: the latter has all the same stuff which the
former has, but also includes a standard of acceleration. What Proposition 6
shows is that—in the case that ρ is nowhere-vanishing—there is a sense in
which this appearance is misleading, since the “extra” structure (the stan-
dard of acceleration) can be defined from the other structure in the model:
the standard of acceleration is defined as that according to which the net
gravitational acceleration of the matter encoded by T ab is zero.
Note that we do need to represent the matter by a mass-momentum
tensor (rather than just a mass density) if this reconstruction is to work: a
mere mass density does not carry enough information to fix a standard of
acceleration, i.e., to determine a unique Newton-Cartan connection.25 For
25Wallace (2016b) and Weatherall (2015) both make the same observation: the underly-
ing point is just that Poisson’s equation admits of homogeneous solutions which correspond
to nontrivial gravitational fields—and since it is linear, superimposing such a solution onto
20
example,26 let 〈L, ∇˜, T ab〉 be some model of Newton-Cartan gravitation, and
consider the structures 〈L, ∇˜, ρ〉 and 〈L, (∇˜, (∇˜aφ)tbtc), ρ〉 (with ρ = T abtatb)
where in some coordinate system (t, x, y, z) adapted to L,
φ = exey sin(
√
2z) (31)
One can show that both structures satisfy equation (10a) (the satisfaction
of equation (10b) does not arise)—and clearly, both structures give rise to
the same standard of rotation, and so both correspond to the same Maxwell-
spacetime-based structure 〈L, [∇], ρ〉.
Now, compare the possibility of reconstructing a model of Newton-Cartan
gravitation from a model of Maxwell gravitation with an observation made
by Pooley.27 He notes that the presentation by Earman and Friedman of
Newtonian spacetime as 〈L,∇, Aa〉 (where Aa is the timelike vector field
representing absolute space) has a certain redundancy: 〈L,Aa〉 has the same
structure, in the sense that the derivative operator∇may be defined from the
structure of L and Aa. One way of thinking about Proposition 6 is as showing
that a Newton-Cartan model 〈L, ∇˜, T ab〉 (in which ρ 6= 0 everywhere) carries
a similar form of redundancy: provided we know the standard of rotation
associated to ∇˜, and provided we know the character of T ab, we can “fill in
the blanks” to reconstruct ∇˜ itself.
That said, there are two important differences between this case and the
case raised by Pooley. The first is that in the example of Newtonian space-
time, we note that a piece of spatiotemporal structure (the connection) may
be defined in terms of other pieces of spatiotemporal structure (the Leibnizian
spacetime structure, plus the structure of absolute space). By contrast, here
a given solution for a fixed mass density ρ will yield another solution for that same mass
density ρ. Note that imposing boundary conditions will typically restore uniqueness of
solutions.
26I take this example from Jim Weatherall; for further discussion, see Dewar and
Weatherall (2017).
27(Pooley, 2013, §4.5)
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we have a piece of spatiotemporal structure (the standard of acceleration) be-
ing defined in terms of spatiotemporal structure (the Maxwellian spacetime
structure) and non-spatiotemporal structure (the mass-momentum tensor).
This gives us a better handle on the question of whether acceleration is ab-
solute or relative in the context of Newtonian gravitation. To claim that
acceleration is relative in Maxwell gravitation would mean taking the space-
time structure in a model 〈L, [∇], T ab〉 to be given by the Maxwell spacetime
〈L, [∇]〉, rather than by the Newton-Cartan structure 〈L, ∇˜〉 definable within
the model. In favour of this interpretation, note that L and [∇] are the only
primitive geometrical structures in any model of Maxwell gravitation; so on
a view which identifies spacetime structure as just the primitive geometrical
structure of a theory, it would be very natural to read this theory as a theory
with merely relative acceleration.28 On the other hand, if one has a different
conception of spacetime structure, then it may well be that the Newton-
Cartan connection is properly identified as spatiotemporal structure—the
fact that it is derived from material dynamical structures (i.e., T ab) notwith-
standing. In particular, Knox’s “spacetime functionalism”29 holds that the
spacetime structure in a theory is whatever structure encodes the relevant
notion of inertial frame in that theory. There are good grounds for thinking
that this role is played by the Newton-Cartan connection—and hence, for the
spacetime functionalist to maintain that acceleration in Maxwell gravitation
is absolute. Thus, this case provides a useful (although admittedly partial)
illustration of the so-called “dynamical approach to spacetime geometry”,30
in which one seeks to characterise spacetime geometry as a codification of
the behaviour of dynamical structures.31
The second (perhaps related) distinction is that such a unique reconstruc-
28For example, Maudlin (2012) and Dorr (2011) are both plausibly read as employing a
methodology of this kind.
29Knox (2014)
30Brown (2005), Stevens (2015)
31Wallace (2016a) discusses these issues in more depth.
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tion is always available in the Newtonian spacetime case,32 whereas unique
reconstruction is here only guaranteed by requiring the nonvanishing of the
matter: in effect, by requiring that there be sufficient material structure to
everywhere “probe” the spatiotemporal structure.
What happens when the matter distribution does vanish in some re-
gions, then? In such a case, we are still able to construct a Newton-Cartan
connection—but, in general, the connection will not be unique. For example,
consider the case where T ab = 0. Trivially, 〈L, [∇],0〉 is a model of Maxwell
gravitation; but we can show that 〈L,∇,0〉 and 〈L, (∇, (∇aφ)tbtc),0〉, where
∇ ∈ [∇] and φ is as in equation (31), are both models of Newton-Cartan
gravitation for which T ab = 0. However, these models are distinct (non-
isomorphic): the connection (∇, (∇aφ)tbtc) is not flat (but merely has a
vanishing Ricci tensor).
Bearing this in mind, consider the following remarks of Saunders:
What of possible worlds, and distinctions among them drawn
in [Newton-Cartan gravitation], invisible to ours? Take possible
worlds each with only a single structureless particle. Depending
on the connection, there will be infinitely many distinct trajecto-
ries, infinitely many distinct worlds of this kind. But in [Maxwell-
gravitation] terms, [. . . ] there is only one such world—a trivial
one in which there are no meaningful predications of the motion
of the particle at all. Only for worlds with two or more particles
can distinctions among motions be drawn.33
We have now seen how to extend this observation to a field-theoretic formu-
lation of Newtonian gravitation: in general, there are distinct but “materi-
ally identical” models of Newton-Cartan gravitation (such as 〈L,∇,0〉 and
〈L, (∇, (∇aφ)tbtc),0〉), which will correspond to a single model of Maxwell
32Admittedly, “always” is a slightly odd term to use here, since there is effectively only
one case: Newtonian spacetime is unique up to isomorphism.
33(Saunders, 2013, pp. 46–47)
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gravitation.
The natural next question is whether Saunders is correct that the extra
structure of Newton-Cartan gravitation compared to Maxwell gravitation
is “surplus”. Consider a pair of such materially identical models M,M ′ of
Newton-Cartan gravitation. The only difference between M and M ′ concerns
the nature of spacetime in empty regions. So, at issue is whether such a
difference constitutes an empirical difference. It turns out, however, that this
is not a clear-cut question, for one can find (intuitively plausible) criteria of
empirical equivalence that generate different answers. On the one hand, M
and M ′ agree with respect to all material structure: thus, the full collection
of every piece of observational data regarding M is identical to that regarding
M ′. On the other, it is not straightforwardly the case that M and M ′ agree
on the content of all possible observations. For although there is not (in
fact) any matter in the empty regions, there could have been—and were
such matter to have been introduced, the motions that it would have made
would suffice to empirically discriminate between M and M ′ (or to rule them
both out in favour of some third alternative). More generally, the distinction
at issue is whether unactualised dispositions may properly be considered as
empirically respectable properties.34
Finally, I turn to comparing the analysis given here with the (related) ac-
count of Weatherall (2015). One difference is with regards to the framework:
Weatherall’s analysis represents the source matter via a mass density ρ, and
considers what kinds of trajectories for test particles would be permissible
for such a mass density. By contrast, the analysis above uses the mass-
momentum tensor T ab to represent matter which is simultaneously source
and test: in the Newton-Cartan theory, for instance, equation (10a) encodes
T ab’s role as source matter, and equation (10b) encodes its role as test mat-
ter. Moreover, the only dynamics in play in Weatherall’s paper is that of
34For an illuminating discussion of Newton’s attitude towards such dispositions (in the
gravitational context), see Stein (1970).
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gravitation.
Within this framework, Weatherall characterises the dynamically per-
missible trajectories (for a given mass density ρ on Maxwell space-time) as
follows. First, observe that given a Maxwell spacetime equipped with a mass
density, 〈L, [∇], ρ〉, for any ∇ ∈ [∇], there exists a spacelike vector field Ga
such that 〈L,∇, ρ, Ga〉 satisfies equations (3a) and (3b). Given such a Ga,
the allowed trajectories are then all and only those curves whose tangents
satisfy
ξn∇nξa = Ga (32)
Note that the choice of Ga (for a given ∇) is not unique, and not just in
the manner captured by the gravitational gauge symmetry (7): for instance,
given a scalar field φ of the form (31), then 〈L, [∇], ρ, Ga + ∇aφ〉 will also
satisfy (3a) and (3b)—but will pick out a different set of allowed trajecto-
ries, where the two sets of trajectories do not even agree on the relative
accelerations of bodies (and hence, correspond to distinct Newton-Cartan
connections).
The models of gravitation on Maxwell spacetime are then identified as
follows: 〈L, [∇], ρ, {γ}〉 (where {γ} is a set of timelike curves on L) is a
model if and only if (i) for any ∇ ∈ [∇], there is some spacelike field Ga∇ such
that 〈L,∇, Ga∇, ρ, {γ}〉 satisfies equations (3a), (3b) and (32); and (ii) {γ} is
appropriately maximal, i.e., if γ′ is a curve such that ξ′n∇nξ′a = Ga∇ (with
respect to any ∇ ∈ [∇]), then γ′ ∈ {γ}. Note that these conditions don’t
quite line up with Maxwell gravitation as I’ve defined it, even allowing for the
difference in framework: Weatherall’s approach doesn’t encode a continuity
equation. More significantly, each model is equipped with all the allowed
trajectories for test particles, even in empty regions (i.e. regions in which
ρ = 0).
Weatherall’s key result is then the following (where I have modified his
notation, to match that used in this paper):
Let {γ}ρ be the collection of allowed trajectories for a given
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mass distribution ρ in Maxwell-Huygens [i.e., Maxwell] space-
time 〈L, [∇]〉 [. . . ]. Then there exists a unique derivative operator
∇˜ such that (1) {γ}ρ consists of the timelike geodesics of ∇˜ and
(2) 〈L, ∇˜〉 is a model of Newton-Cartan theory for mass density
ρ.35
One word of warning: speaking of the collection of allowed trajectories for
a given mass distribution (in a Maxwell spacetime) is a little infelicitous,
since—as discussed above—a mass density on Maxwell spacetime does not
fix a unique collection of allowed trajectories for test particles. So it would
be better to speak of a collection of allowed trajectories.36
Now, to facilitate the comparison between this and Proposition 6, recall
that (in the contexts where ρ 6= 0, i.e., the contexts in which Proposition 6
applies) we can decompose the mass-momentum tensor into a vector field
ξa and a stress tensor σab—and if σab vanishes (i.e. in the absence of non-
gravitational interactions) the reconstructed connection is that according to
which the integral curves of ξa are geodesics. So whereas Weatherall’s obser-
vation is that a full collection of dynamically allowed trajectories is sufficient
to pick out a unique Newton-Cartan connection, Proposition 6 shows that a
single congruence of such trajectories is sufficient. This makes Weatherall’s
result slightly less strong than Proposition 6, at least in the context of non-
vanishing ρ: it is a generic feature of differential geometry that a connection
is uniquely identified by its geodesics, whereas it is not typically the case
that a single congruence of geodesics is sufficient.37 (It suffices in the context
of Proposition 6 only because of the further requirement that the Newton-
Cartan connection be compatible with the background Maxwell spacetime.)
35(Weatherall, 2015, Proposition 4)
36To be clear, it’s evident that Weatherall appreciates this—I’m just aiming to forestall
potential confusions that might arise from quoting him out of context.
37Which is not to say that the observation is trivial: it is a nontrivial fact that one can
identify a collection of allowed trajectories in such a manner that they will be apt to be
the geodesics of some connection. (For a discussion of how to determine whether a class
of curves may be interpreted as the geodesics of some connection, see Matveev (2012).)
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That said, because Weatherall’s approach also includes the trajectories for
test particles in empty regions, a model of Newton-Cartan gravitation can
always be reconstructed from a model of Weatherall gravitation, even if there
are empty regions.
Weatherall argues that this result shows that Saunders has made an error
here:
[The proposition above]—at least as I interpret it here—reveals
a certain inadequacy in Saunders’s account. Saunders insists
that there is no privileged standard of acceleration in Maxwell-
Huygens space-time. [. . . ] Nonetheless, it turns out that once one
takes the dynamically allowed trajectories into account, one can
define a standard of acceleration, namely, the unique one relative
to which the allowed trajectories are geodesics.38
Of course, Weatherall’s technical claim here is quite correct; but I suggest
that the technical claim doesn’t quite capture what Saunders has in mind.
From Saunders’ remarks, it seems clear that he is not including all dynam-
ically allowed trajectories as part of the empirical content of the theory;
rather, he is including only the actual trajectories, the actual motions of
matter. In other words, the disagreement between Saunders and Weatherall
is essentially that already discussed, over what the most appropriate criterion
of empirical equivalence between models of Newton-Cartan gravitation is.
Saunders appeals to the former criterion (where empirical equivalence means
agreement with respect to material structure), and so concludes that Newton-
Cartan gravitation draws distinctions without differences; Weatherall appeals
to the latter criterion (where empirical equivalence requires agreement about
the counterfactual motions of hypothetical test particles),39 and so denies
38(Weatherall, 2015, pp. 89–90)
39For instance, “given some distribution of matter in space-time, it is these curves [the
allowed trajectories] that form the empirical content of Newtonian gravitational theory.”
(Weatherall, 2015, p. 89)
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that Newton-Cartan gravitation draws distinctions without differences. In-
sofar as Maxwell gravitation does collapse those distinctions, it—rather than
Weatherall’s theory—represents the natural extension of Saunders’ remarks
to the field-theoretic context.
Finally, even besides these differences over which class of models are
picked out, there is also (I claim) a value to having equations which more
simply and directly pick out the models. In particular, it helps us see a little
more clearly the reason why the theory may be set on Maxwell spacetime,
but not on anything weaker. If the game is just that of picking out a certain
class of models, then we can set a gravitational theory on Leibniz spacetime
just as easily as upon Maxwell spacetime. For consider the following theory,
of “Leibniz gravitation”: a triple 〈L, ρ, {γ}〉 is a model of Leibniz gravitation
if and only if for some ∇ compatible with L, there is some spacelike field Ga
such that 〈L,∇, Ga, ρ, {γ}〉 is a model of Galilean gravitation; and (ii) {γ} is
appropriately maximal. We can prove a reconstruction theorem for Leibniz
gravitation of just the same sort as Weatherall gravitation: given any model
of Leibniz gravitation 〈L, ρ, {γ}〉, there is a unique derivative operator ∇˜
such that 〈L, ∇˜, ρ, {γ}〉 is a model of Newton-Cartan gravitation.40
Yet Leibniz gravitation is a blatant pseudo-theory—“arrant knavery”, as
Belot rightly derides it.41 Why is it knavery? I say: because we cannot give
any set of equations, formulated in terms which refer only to the structure
of Leibnizian spacetime, which picks out those models. This is not to say
that there isn’t a distinction between the forms of Leibniz gravitation and
Weatherall gravitation: in Leibniz gravitation, rather than universally quan-
tifying over connections compatible with the background structure, we exis-
tentially quantified over them. My claim is just that the fact that Maxwell
gravitation is a legitimate theory, whereas Leibniz gravitation is not, can be
40We can only do this because of the presence of all members of {γ}, though. Unlike
Maxwell spacetime, Leibniz spacetime has insufficient structure to enable one to infer a
unique connection from a single vector field.
41Belot (2000)
28
hard to see when both are presented merely as classes of models. By contrast,
if we insist that the class of models be picked out by a set of equations, then
we can more easily keep ourselves honest.42
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